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Abstract
We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which
makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the
deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be in-
e±cient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become
very patient, the unique outcome is always ine±cient.
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473945.1 Introduction
Negotiations often take place under the pressure of a deadline. The deadline may be
exogenously imposed, or one of the parties to the negotiation may have chosen the deadline
and made a credible commitment to it. Recent work has focused on bargaining models
with exogenous deadlines after which there is no surplus to be divided. See Fershtman
and Seidmann [3], Ma and Manove [7]. A key feature of our paper is that we provide
a ¯rst attempt to endogenize the deadline in negotiation models. We consider a more
general de¯nition of a deadline. It is a point in time after which the surplus to be shared
is permanently reduced.
Moreover, we allow the players to choose the level of surplus destruction after the
deadline. So, in case an agreement is not reached before the deadline, the value of the
underlying relationship will be permanently reduced and the level of surplus destruction
will depend on the actions of the players. Then, the surplus available to the players once
an agreement is reached may actually be lower than it is at the beginning.
One example of bargaining in the face of such endogenous deadlines are wage nego-
tiations between unions and employers. On the one hand, both parties may have the
opportunity to settle a deadline after which starts either a strike or a lockout. The dead-
line may be subject to labour laws : it is common that a strike or a lockout requires few
days' notice in order to be legal. On the other hand, a con°ict may reduce permanently
the pro¯tability of the relationship itself by a®ecting, for example, the future demand for
the ¯rm's products. Indeed, customers may decide to buy from now on to some competi-
tor. So, in order to avoid the lost of customers, the ¯rm may decide moving (partially
or entirely) the production to another plant or using replacement workers. But not only
the ¯rm has actions at its disposal that directly in°uence the pro¯tability of the future
relationship. For example, the union may jeopardized production equipment by the lack
of scheduled maintenance or skilled operators.1
In this paper, we develop a two-stage negotiation model with complete information
between a ¯rm and a union. In the ¯rst stage, the deadline in force during the wage
bargaining is chosen. That is, the ¯rm and the union choose, respectively, a lockout
date (and the intensity of the lockout) and a strike date (and the intensity of the strike).
Nevertheless, we allow both parties to choose no deadline. In the second stage, both parties
1Cutcher et al. [1] have examined for the U.S. pressure tactics used by unions and employers to in°uence
the process in collective bargaining and its outcomes. In the past, the threats of a strike and the imminent
contract expiration deadline have been central features motivating the parties to reach agreements. But in
recent years, the observations suggest that management threats regarding replacement workers and plant
closings or movings are now also a key part of the collective bargaining landscape.
1are bargaining over the division of a surplus which is time dependent. Indeed, before the
deadline we will have a peaceful bargaining, where in each period until a new agreement
is reached both parties continue to produce and the value added is shared following the
old wage contract. After the deadline we will have an open-con°ict bargaining (a strike
or a lockout has occurred), where in each period until a new agreement is reached both
parties get nothing and the value added in later periods (once an agreement is reached)
will be a®ected by the intensity of the con°ict occurred. The wage bargaining proceeds
following Rubinstein's [9] alternating-o®er bargaining procedure with the ¯rm making the
¯rst o®er.
We show that the equilibrium outcome of our negotiation model is always unique but
might be ine±cient. The condition to get ine±ciency is satis¯ed whenever the old wage is
relatively small, each player has at his disposal both actions that reduce substantially the
value added in the future and actions that have only a minor impact on the future value
added, and the players are not impatient. Which is the intuition behind the result? Both
players would like that the other player is the last mover at the deadline and preferably
facingthe threat of a con°ict of a strong intensity. A strong con°ict simply means that after
the deadline the value added will be reduced substantially. Then, in order to avoid having
to accept a very low wage o®er facing the threat of a severe lockout, where the ¯rm would
grab most of the surplus, it becomes optimal for the union to go on strike immediately
and to destroy part of the future value added, but not too much. So, at equilibrium
we observe both players competing to be the one who will make an o®er just before the
deadline, but also trying to avoid to have to move at the deadline facing the threat of a very
strong con°ict. This can lead to one party launching the con°ict immediately and to the
conclusion of a Pareto-dominated agreement. Finally, as the bargaining period becomes
short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always ine±cient.
Our two-stage negotiation model is related to papers that derive bargaining ine±ciency
under complete information2, e.g. van Damme, Selten and Winter [11], Fernandez and
Glazer [2], Haller and Holden [4]. One important di®erence is that ine±ciency and delay
can arise in these other models because there exist multiple e±cient equilibria, while the
equilibrium is always unique but sometimes ine±cient in our model.
Another strand of related literature includes papers on bargaining models with ex-
ogenous deadlines. In fact, any ¯nite horizon bargaining model can be interpreted as
such. Fershtman and Seidmann [3] study a complete information bargaining model with
a random proposer and an exogenous deadline beyond which there is no surplus to divide.
They assume that a player cannot accept a lower share of the surplus than she has pre-
2Another source for agreements reached with delay is incomplete information (see e.g. Watson [13]).
2viously rejected during the bargaining session. This endogenous commitment assumption
together with the deadline imply that, for patient players, there is a unique equilibrium
where agreements are delayed until the deadline. This result depends on the interaction
between the existence of a deadline and endogenous commitment. Absent the endogenous
commitment, the other assumption cannot explain delay. Ma and Manove [7] construct a
bargaining model with complete information, whose unique equilibrium is such that early
in the game o®ers are postponed and late in the game agreements are reached or the
deadline is missed with positive probability. To obtain such equilibrium two assumptions
are introduced to the ¯nite-horizon alternating-o®er bargaining model. The ¯rst one is
strategic delay. An alternating-o®er model incorporates strategic delay if a player is per-
mitted to postpone the implementation of her move without losing her turn. The second
assumption is imperfect player control over the timing of o®ers during the bargaining
session. O®ers and counter-o®ers are exchanged with exogenous random delay.
In these papers just mentioned, the deadline is exogenously determined. Here, we show
that once the deadline is endogenous, no other assumptions such as e.g. endogenous com-
mitment or strategic delay is needed to get a unique and ine±cient equilibrium. Moreover,
our result may also justify the existence of Pareto-inferior phenomena other than strikes
or lockouts, such as tari® wars, debt moratoria, break-up of cease-¯res or wars in general.
The next section presents the basic negotiation model and some preliminary results.
In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium of the deadline stage game and we show that
the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be ine±cient. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Negotiation Model
We develop a two-stage negotiation model. The timing of this negotiation model is de-
picted in Figure 1. In the ¯rst stage, before the wage bargaining starts at time 0, the
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Figure 1: The timing of the negotiation model
3¯rm and the union choose simultaneously a lockout date df 2 f0;1;2;:::;d;1g and its
intensity °f 2 f°;°g and a strike date du 2 f0;1;2;:::;d;1g and its intensity °u 2 f°;°g,
respectively. We allow both parties to choose no deadline, e.g. df = 1 simply means that
the ¯rm decides to not choose a lockout date. Afterwards, the players are committed to
the deadline and its intensity they have chosen. A deadline rule that seems reasonable
and ¯ts perfectly with wage negotiations is the following one. Let (d;°) be the deadline





(df;°f) if df < du;
(du;°u) if du < df;
(du;minf°f;°ug) if du = df:
(1)
That is, the deadline in force and its intensity (d;°) are determined by the minimum of
the deadline choices of the players, and in case of ties, ties are broken in favour of the
more intense con°ict. This simple deadline rule implies that the wage bargaining will take
place facing either the threat of a lockout or the threat of a strike.3 Finally, (1;¢) denotes
the case where both parties decide to choose nor a strike date nor a lockout date.4
In the second stage of the negotiation model, the deadline d and its intensity ° settled
are common knowledge and both parties begin to negotiate. There is an in¯nite number
of periods, and in each period of normal production the ¯rm has a value added of one unit
of a good which the ¯rm and the union can divide between them. The union's share is
W 2 [0;1], the ¯rm's share is 1¡W. Two bargaining phases are distinguished. Before the
deadline we will have a peaceful bargaining, where in each period until a new agreement
is reached both parties continue to produce and the value added is shared following the
old contract. Initially the wage level in the old contract is W0 > 0. After the deadline we
will have an open-con°ict bargaining (a strike or a lockout has occurred), where in each
period until a new agreement is reached both parties get zero and the value added in later
periods (once a new agreement is reached) will be a®ected by the intensity of the con°ict
occurred, ° (where ° will be equal to ° or ° with ° < ° < 1).
3For simplicity and for the sake of presentation we have chosen a speci¯cation that excludes the possi-
bility of having simultaneously a lockout and a strike. However, the results we will obtain are, under some
weak condition, qualitatively robust to another speci¯cation where con°icts have an additive destructive
impact on the future value added to be shared.
4We can also interpret the commitment assumption to start a con°ict at the deadline in terms of
negotiators' reputation. Imagine that no agreement has been reached and that the union decides not to go
on strike at the chosen deadline. Since the strike date is public knowledge (due to labour laws), the union
would loose most of his reputation for the on-going negotiation as well as for future ones. In other words,
the results we obtain are robust to the case where the commitment is revocable but the cost of revoking
is large enough.
4For simplicity, both parties are assumed to have linear utility functions, so their payo®s




±t ¢ ut, (2)
where ut = W0 if t < d and an agreement has yet to be reached, ut = 0 if t ¸ d and no
agreement has been reached, and ut = W for t ¸ s if an agreement is reached at period s




±t ¢ vt, (3)
where vt = 1 ¡ W0 if t < d and an agreement has yet to be reached, ut = 0 if t ¸ d and
no agreement has been reached, ut = 1¡W for t ¸ s if an agreement is reached at period
s < d, and ut = ° ¡ W for t ¸ s if an agreement is reached at period s ¸ d.
The bargaining proceeds following Rubinstein's [9] alternating-o®er bargaining proce-
dure. The players are assumed to make o®ers alternately, one o®er per period, and without
loss of generality the ¯rm is assumed to make an o®er in the beginning of period 0. The
union can then accept or reject this o®er. If the union accepts, the bargaining ends. If
the ¯rm's o®er is rejected the union makes a new o®er in the next period, which the ¯rm
accepts or rejects. If the ¯rm accepts, the bargaining ends. If the union's o®er is rejected
the ¯rm makes a new o®er in the next period, and so on until an agreement is reached.
Both parties are assumed to have perfect information in the bargaining stage.
We denote B(d;°) the bargaining stage, in other words the alternating-o®er bargaining
game where it is common knowledge that the deadline is d and its intensity is °. As in
Rubinstein, one can show that the alternating-o®er bargaining game B(d;°) possesses a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and that an agreement is reached without delay
at period 0. When the deadline in force is an odd period the SPE wage W¤(d odd;°) and
payo®s are:









1 ¡ ±2, (5)









When the deadline in force is an even period the SPE wage W¤(d even;°) and payo®s
are:
5W¤(d even;°) = (1 ¡ ±d) ¢W0 +







±d ¢ (1 +± ¡ °)
1 ¡ ±2 , (8)







±d ¢ (1+ ± ¡°)
1 ¡±2 . (9)
When the deadline in force is settled at period 0, we enter immediately in an open-con°ict







1 ¡±2, V ¤(0;°) =
°
1 ¡±2. (10)
When no deadline is settled, the SPE wage W¤(1;¢) and payo®s are (see Haller and
Holden [4]):
W ¤(1;¢) = W0, U¤(1;¢) =
W0
1 ¡±




Comparing the expressions here above, we obtain the next lemma which gives us some
ideas about the preferences of the players over the intensity of the con°ict at equilibrium
given a deadline d.
Lemma 1 For any deadline d odd, W¤(d;°) < W¤(d;°), U¤(d;°) < U¤(d;°), and
V ¤(d;°) > V ¤(d;°). For any deadline d 6= 0 even, W ¤(d;°) > W¤(d;°), U¤(d;°) >
U¤(d;°), and V ¤(d;°) < V ¤(d;°).
Lemma 1 tells us that, the union prefers the negotiation facing the threat of a con°ict
of a weak (strong) intensity rather than facing the threat of a con°ict of a strong (weak)
intensity whenever the deadline is odd (even). A con°ict of a strong intensity is simply
the case where ° = °, and a con°ict of a weak intensity is the case ° = °. On the
contrary, the ¯rm prefers the negotiation facing the threat of a con°ict of a strong (weak)
intensity rather than facing the threat of a con°ict of a weak (strong) intensity whenever
the deadline is odd (even).
3 Endogenous Deadlines
We turn back to stage one of the negotiation model, where the ¯rm and the union choose
simultaneously a lockout date df 2 f0;1;2;:::;d;1g and its intensity °f 2 f°;°g and a
6strike date du 2 f0;1;2;:::;d;1g and its intensity °u 2 f°;°g, respectively.5 So, a strategy
for the ¯rm is denoted by (df;°f) and a strategy for the union is denoted (du;°u) in the
deadline stage game. Remember that the deadline in force during the wage negotiation is
the earliest date among the lockout date and the strike date. In case of a tie we simply
assume that the con°ict with the strongest intensity will start at the chosen deadline. This
assumption to break ties is quite reasonable in case of wage negotiations. Nevertheless,
the results we obtain are qualitatively robust to a more general assumption where ties are
broken with high probability in favour of the strongest con°ict.
Since we allow the ¯rm to choose (df = 0;°f) and the union to choose (du = 0;°u),
possible ine±ciency is not excluded a-priori. In Table 1 we represent (very partially) the
matrix of the deadline stage game, where the ¯rm is the row player and the union is the
column player.
0;° 0;° 1;° 2;° 1;¢
0;° ° ¡W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°) ° ¡W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°)
0;° ° ¡W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°) ° ¡W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°)
1;° ° ¡W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°) 1 ¡W¤(1;°) 1 ¡ W¤(1;°) 1 ¡W¤(1;°)
2;° ° ¡W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°) 1 ¡W¤(1;°) 1 ¡ W¤(2;°) 1 ¡W¤(2;°)
1;¢ ° ¡W¤(0;°) ° ¡ W¤(0;°) 1 ¡W¤(1;°) 1 ¡ W¤(2;°) 1 ¡W0
Table 1: The strategic choice of a deadline
In the matrix we only give the per-period SPE payo® for the ¯rm; the per-period SPE
payo® for the union is simply the SPE wage. For solving the deadline stage game, a
natural concept would be the Nash equilibrium (NE). But, this concept fails to exclude
strategy pro¯les that seem implausible such as f(0;°);(0;°)g and, moreover, there is
a multiplicity of NE. As a consequence, we propose to use the trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium (THPE) concept as a device to select plausible outcomes among the Nash
ones.
In order to characterize the THPE of the deadline stage game, we will use two well-
known results (see van Damme [10]). First, since the deadline stage game is a ¯nite
two-player game, the strategy pro¯le ((df;°f);(du;°u)) is a THPE if and only if it is a
NE and neither (df;°f) nor (du;°u) is weakly dominated with respect to f0;1;2;:::;d;1g.
We say that a player's action is weakly dominated if the player has another action at least
5The set of deadline dates is assumed to be ¯nite (in order to apply well-known results on ¯nite games)
and to be identical for both parties. The upper bound d 2 N is large enough to make the analysis
interesting. Obviously, a distinct upper bound for each party would not modify our analysis. Moreover,
the results we obtain are not modi¯ed if we allow more than two levels of intensity of the con°ict.
7as good no matter what the other player does and better for at least some action of the
other player. Second, every ¯nite game has at least one THPE.6
From Lemma 1 and the weak dominance concept, it is obvious that (df odd;°) is
weakly dominated by (df odd;°). Indeed, (i) against any (du;°u) such that du > df
the strategy (df odd;°) is doing strictly better than (df odd;°), (ii) against any (du;°u)
such that du < df the strategy (df odd;°) is doing as well as (df odd;°), (iii) against
any (du;°u) such that du = df the strategy (df odd;°) is doing strictly better than (df
odd;°) if °u = ° and is doing equal if °u = °. Similarly, one can show that (df even;°) is
weakly dominated by (df even;°), (du odd;°) is weakly dominated by (du odd;°), (du 6= 0
even;°) is weakly dominated by (du 6= 0 even;°), and (du = 0;°) is weakly dominated by
(du = 0;°).
Lemma 2 The strategies (df odd;°), (df even;°), (du odd;°), (du 6= 0 even;°) and
(du = 0;°) are all weakly dominated.
Throughout the paper we will focus on the case where the players are su±ciently pa-
tient (± large), which can be reinterpreted as if the interval between o®ers and countero®ers
is short.7 More precisely, we focus on the case where ± > ° > °.
Assumption 1 ± > °.
Lemma 3 The strategies (df even;°), (du odd;°) are all weakly dominated.
Indeed, if ± > ° then (df 6= 0 even;°) is weakly dominated by (df ¡ 1;°), (df = 0;°)
is weakly dominated by (df = 1;°), and (du odd;°) is weakly dominated by (du + 1;°).
Throughout the paper the proofs related to weak dominance results are similar to the
one of Lemma 2 and, henceforth, these proofs are omitted. What will be the equilibrium
outcomes?
Lemma 4 If W0 <
1+±¡°
1+± then the strategies (du ¸ 4 and even;°) and (du = 1;¢) are
weakly dominated.
Lemma 5 If W0 >
°
1+± then the strategies (df ¸ 3 and odd;°) and (df = 1;¢) are weakly
dominated.
6The same results can be obtained using rationalizability concepts (de¯ned in Herings and Vannetel-
bosch [6],[5], and Vannetelbosch [12]) instead of equilibrium ones for both the bargaining game and the
deadline game.
7The discount factor can also be expressed by the formula ± = exp(¡r ¢ ¢), where r > 0 is discount
rate and ¢ is the length of a single bargaining period.
8Could it be that the no deadline situation is an equilibrium outcome? The answer
is negative. Indeed, from Lemma 2 to Lemma 5 we already know that, the ¯rm will
choose (1;°) for sure if W0 >
°
1+± and the union will choose between (0;°) and (2;°) if
W0 <
1+±¡°






It follows from Lemma 2 to Lemma 5 that, at equilibrium, the union could choose
either the strategies (0;°) or (2;°) and the ¯rm could choose either the strategies
(df ¸ 1 odd;°) or (1;¢). If the union chooses (2;°) then the unique best response
for the ¯rm is (1;°). If the union chooses (0;°) then best responses for the ¯rm
are (df ¸ 1 odd;°) and (1;¢). If the ¯rm chooses (df ¸ 3 odd;°) or (1;¢) then
the unique best response for the union is (2;°). If the ¯rm chooses (1;°) then the
unique best response for the union is (0;°) if W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °) and is (2;°)
otherwise. Indeed, W ¤(0;°) = ±
1+±° > (1 ¡ ±)W0 + ±
1+±° = W¤(1;°) reverts to
W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °). As a consequence, the unique THPE is f(1;°);(0;°)g if
W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °) and is f(1;°);(2;°)g otherwise.
Case 2 :
1+±¡°
1+± > W0 >
°
1+±.
It follows from Lemma 2 to Lemma 5 that, at equilibrium, the union could choose
either the strategies (0;°) or (2;°) and the ¯rm is going to choose for sure the
strategy (1;°). Hence, given that the ¯rm chooses (1;°), the union will choose (0;°)
if W¤(0;°) = ±
1+±° > (1¡±)W0+ ±
1+±° = W¤(1;°). That is, if W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(°¡°).
Otherwise, the union will choose (2;°).





It follows from Lemma 2 to Lemma 5 that, at equilibrium, the union could choose
either the strategies (0;°) or (du ¸ 2 even;°) or (1;¢) and the ¯rm is going to
choose for sure the strategy (1;°). Hence, given that the ¯rm chooses (1;°), the
union will choose (0;°) if W¤(0;°) = ±
1+±° > (1 ¡ ±)W0 + ±
1+±° = W¤(1;°). That
is, if W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °). Otherwise, the union will choose (du ¸ 2 even;°) or
(1;¢).
Having characterized the equilibrium strategies we can show that the deadline stage
game has a unique THPE. Indeed, if W0 > ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °) then the unique THPE
outcome is d = 1 and ° = °. So, at equilibrium, the ¯rm and the union will start the
wage bargaining under the threat of a severe lockout at period 1. The ¯rm will make a
wage o®er W¤(d = 1;°) = (1 ¡ ±) ¢ W0 +
±°
1+± at period 0, and the union will accept this
o®er immediately.
9Proposition 1 If W0 > ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °) then the negotiation model has a unique and
e±cient equilibrium outcome. The deadline (a lockout threat of a strong intensity) is
settled at period 1 and an agreement on W¤(d = 1;°) is reached immediately at period 0.
However, if W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡°) there is a unique THPE strategy pro¯le where the
¯rm chooses (df = 1;°) and the union chooses (du = 0;°). So, if W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °)
the unique THPE outcome is d = 0 and ° = °, and it is an ine±cient outcome since a
strike of a weak intensity occurs immediately at the start of the wage bargaining.
That is, if the equilibrium wage in case of an immediate strike of a weak intensity is
greater than the equilibrium wage in case of the union moving at the deadline and facing
the threat of a lockout of a strong intensity, then the union will choose at equilibrium to
implement immediately a strike of a weak intensity. Which is the intuition behind this
result? Since the old wage contract is small enough, the di®erence between ° and ° is
large enough and the players are enough patient, it becomes optimal for the union to go
immediately on strike and to destroy part of the available surplus. Indeed, such a con°ict
of a weak intensity allows the union to avoid having to accept a very low wage o®er facing
the threat of a severe lockout, where the ¯rm would grab most of the surplus. So, at
equilibrium, the union goes into con°ict immediately and a Pareto-dominated agreement
follows. In fact, this equilibrium outcome is Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium outcome
of B(du = 1;°). At equilibrium, the ¯rm will make a wage o®er W¤(d = 0;°) =
±°
1+± at
period 0, and the union will accept this o®er immediately.
Proposition 2 If W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(° ¡ °) then the negotiation model has a unique and
ine±cient equilibrium outcome. A con°ict of a weak intensity starts immediately at time
0 followed by an immediate agreement on W¤(d = 0;°). The per-period e±ciency loss is
equal to 1 ¡ °.
So, the ¯rm at equilibrium chooses (df = 1;°) because either it is a dominant strategy
or if he does not then the union would choose another deadline and it would be the ¯rm
that would face the threat of a severe strike where the union would grab most of the
surplus.
The condition W0 < ±
(1+±)(1¡±)(°¡°) is satis¯ed whenever the old wage W0 is relatively
small, eachplayer has at his disposal bothactions that reduce substantially the value added
in the future and actions that have only a minor impact on the future value added8 (in
8The actions as well as their impact on the future value added may depend on factors such as the
competition on both the product market and the labour market (see Cutcher et al. [1]). Indeed, in case
there is a strong competition on the product market, a labour con°ict may induce a big loss in market
power and future revenues to be generated. However, in case there is a strong competition and mobility on
10other words, the di®erence between ° and ° is large enough) and the players are not
impatient (± is large enough).
Before concluding we will also consider the limit case of fully patient players as ± goes
to one.
Corollary 1 As ± goes to one or as the interval between o®ers and countero®ers van-
ishes, the negotiation model has a unique and ine±cient equilibrium. A con°ict of a weak
intensity starts at time zero followed by an immediate agreement on W ¤(d = 0;°) = 1
2°.
Notice that we have taken the limit ± ! 1 assuming that the players can still re-
duce permanently the future value added.9 This assumption may be questionable once
we reinterpret the limit as the interval between o®ers and countero®ers is vanishing. An
alternative assumption is to suppose that the level of surplus destruction would be declin-
ing with ¢ decreasing. Nevertheless, we still obtain the ine±ciency result if we assume
that the intensities of a con°ict are bounded below one. That is, if °(¢) < °(¢) < ± for
all ¢ and lim¢!0 °(¢) < lim¢!0 °(¢) < 1.
4 Conclusion
We have developed a two-person negotiation model with complete information which is a
¯rst attempt to make endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction
after the deadline. We have shown that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but
might be ine±cient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players
become very patient, the unique outcome is always ine±cient. So, our model may also
justify the existence of Pareto-inferior phenomena other than labor con°icts, such as tari®
wars, debt moratoria, break-up of cease-¯res or wars in general. One very interesting
extension would be to consider a more general bargaining procedure as in Perry and Reny
[8], which allows the players to choose when and whether or not to make an o®er.
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